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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 23/01/2008 Accident number: 503 
Accident time: 08:45 Accident Date: 15/11/2006 
Where it occurred: MF-2002/168-337, 
Injeel District, Herat 
City, Herat Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 22/11/2006 
ID original source: 01/03/031/502/06 Name of source: UNMACA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  




Date record created:  Date  last modified: 23/01/2008 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude: 64° 14' 15" Latitude: 34° 21' 52" 
Alt. coord. system: 62 14 51.5: 34 21 52.4 Coordinates fixed by: GPS 
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
inconsistent statements (?) 
long handtool may have reduced injury (?) 
metal-detector not used (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
use of shovel (?) 
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Accident report 
The report of this accident was made available in August 2007 as a PDF file. Its conversion to 
a text file for editing means that some of the formatting has been lost. The substance of the 
report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. The original PDF file is held on record. Text 
in [ ] is editorial. 
 
Initial letter 
Details of Accident 
At 8:45hrs on Wednesday the 15th November 2006 [National demining agency] MCT-8, a de-
miner was involved in an accident at Division 17th MF-0337 east of Herat City. 
The accident occurred while the deminer was prodding/excavating. [The mine was a PMN AP 
mine.] 
Injuries to the victim deminer occurred when he was using a bayonet or shovel during 
operations 
Mr. [Name removed] Assistant team leader led the team as the team leader Mr. [Name 
removed] was on leave. The injured person received first aid and was evacuated to Herat 
public hospital under the care of Dr. [Name removed], [National demining agency] Medical 
Officer Herat. 
A copy of the [National demining agency] situation report submitted by Mr. [Name removed], 
[National demining agency] Field officer is attached at Annex A. 
Injuries 
As a result of the explosion the deminer received minor injuries to his left hand and crush 
injuries to his left arm plus a single wound (1 to 1.5cm) to his left thigh where a foreign body 
penetrated the muscle. The [National demining agency] doctor indicated this object to be a 
small stone. These injuries indicate that his left hand was close to the point of detonation and 
he was facing sideways to allow the foreign object to pass under his protective vest. This is 
not consistent with proper use of the prodder but could be said to be consistent if sitting or 




To: Chief of Operations, UNMACA Kabul 
Cc:  deputy TQM Specialist in UNMACA 
From: Area Manager AMAC Herat 
Date: 27 November 2006 
Sub: [National demining agency]/MCT-8 Demining Accident Investigation Report 
Please find attached the investigation report for Demining accident, which was occurred upon 
a deminer of [National demining agency]/MCT-8 on 15 November 2006 in MF No- 
20/2002/168/0337 located in division-17, Injeel district of Herat province. 
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AMAC HERAT INVESTIGATION ON MINE CLEARANCE ACCIDENT 
AT 17th DIVISION-MF-0337, HERAT ON 15TH NOVEMBER 2006 
Investigation conducted by [Name removed], Area Manager Herat, [Name removed], 
Operations Associate and [Name removed] Quality Management Assistant Herat. 
 
To: Chief of Operation UNMACA, Kabul 
From:  UNAMAC Herat, Western Region.  
Report submitted: 22 November 2006 
Background history of the Division 17th and MF-337: 
The 17th Army Division base is about 5 square kilometres and is located approximately 3km 
east of the city. The Division lies on the southern side of a series of hills running east west 
and is the northern border to the city. The area contains numerous valleys and spur lines. 
There are no maps or aerial photographs available of the base. 
In October and November 2001, Coalition Forces bombed Taliban munition stockpiles 
throughout Division 17th. The stockpile were targeted to deny Taliban Forces the opportunity 
to use the Ordnance against Coalition Forces, however, some of the stored ordnance was 
thrown out of the structures and scattered over large areas of the Division. The team is 
responsible for collecting ammunition and handing over to EOD teams. A backhoe from 
[Other national demining NGO] is also in support and has been used to clear access routes 
into the minefield to the destroyed bunkers. 
During the Russian invasion in Afghanistan large quantities of ammunition were stored in this 
valley of the 11th Artillery Garrison inside Division 17th and was protected by a belt of AP 
mines, which are currently being cleared by [National demining agency] MCT-8. 
The MF-0337 was surveyed on 02 June 2005 with a total area is 82,310 sqm and on Dec 
2005 the MF was tasked to [National demining agency]. They have found and destroyed 189 
AP mines and 24,813 UXO during clearance. 
 
MINE ACCIDENT AT 17th DIVISION MF-NO-337 
References: 
A. Afghan Mine Action Standards (AMAS) 
B. Initial Incident report [National demining agency] 
SUMMARY 
Organisation: [National demining agency] 
Team: MCT-Team-08 
Supervisor: [Name removed] 
Location: Division 17th Injeel District, Herat 
Date/Time: 8:45am,15th November 2006 
Deminer’s Injuries shown below. 
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Site conditions: The accident occurred on a hillside with soft, wet soil. The weather was 
clear, calm and mild. The vegetation was “rocky, grass”. 
The site consists of a 35/40-degree slope with terraces cut into the slope at regular intervals. 
The accident occurred on the uphill side of one of the terraces very close to the flat ground of 
the terrace. The area shown in the photograph below is a known mine belt that stretched for 
many hundreds of metres in both directions into a small valley and extends around the other 
side of the valley as well. 
The soil is soft and spongy from recent heavy rain and contains small rocks and stones. 
There is extensive evidence of erosion, which has helped to reshape the terraces with 
deposits from above. The investigating team believe the mine was buried deeper than normal 
because of accumulated soil. 




These photographs show the edge of the initial excavation of 130mm. [The point of initiation 
appears to be well inside the cleared area.] It is possible the deminer was using the shovel to 
speed up clearance and used it as a digging tool? Why he would do this is a mystery as all 
members of this team were experienced with this site and knew that mines had been found 
elsewhere at greater depths. 
 
Equipment 
The victim deminer was wearing his PPE correctly during operations and has saved him from 
serious major injuries. 
At the time of the accident the investigating team were in an adjoining minefield and arrived 
on site 10 minutes after hearing the explosion. At that time the investigating team noticed that 
the equipment had been removed and during further investigation found that the deminer's 
tools, being a long bayonet and small shovel (entrenching tool) were missing. 
Team command staff could not account for the lack of equipment and suggested that the 
prodder is probably somewhere else in the minefield? All uncleared areas of the minefield can 
easily be seen and there is NO evidence of any tool. The lack of tools at the accident site is 
mystifying as he supposedly set the mine off with one of the items, and it should have been 
close by, but both are missing! The investigating team conducted a check of equipment and 
found the team to be deficient one prodder and one shovel. The team leader could not explain 
this situation. The investigating team believe the site was tampered with before our arrival. 
The investigating team observed broken Bakelite pieces of a PMN mine at the accident site. 
According to the team command group the section leader was about 100 meters from the 
accident point at the time of the accident. This places him on the other side of the valley. 
Even so, he had excellent observation with all the deminers and should have seen any 
improper procedures easily. 
The accident has occurred while the deminer was excavating. The soil condition in this 
minefield is high fragmentation and full excavation is necessary. The accident occurred during 
this excavation process but the investigating team is unable to determine if it was caused by 
bayonet or shovel as both are missing? It is possible that the mine was detonated by the 
shovel being used as an excavation tool, instead of its proper role in cleared soil removal. 




Team member Statements: 
The investigation team was unable to take a written statement from victim deminer, because 
he is illiterate. He was also unable to talk to the investigators as he was suffering from hearing 
loss and could not hear any questions given to him. 




The accident was cause by human error. 
The accident occurred by incorrect use of either the bayonet or the shovel. 
Command staff and other team members may have tampered with the site and removed 
evidence. Command and control at the site was poor. 
 
Recommendations 
All [National demining agency] deminers are to undergo refresher training on the correct use 
of tools. 
All [National demining agency] command staff undergoes refresher training on their roles and 
responsibilities.  
All [National demining agency] staff undergoes refresher training on securing an accident site. 
[National demining agency] conduct an internal investigation regarding the accident site being 
tampered with and report to Chief of Operations UNMACA with the findings and any 
disciplinary actions to be taken within two weeks of this report being submitted. 
 
[National demining agency] initial report letter 
To: AM UNAMAC Western Region 
From: Field officer of [National demining agency] in Herat 
Date: 15/11/2006 
Sub: Mine accident Report 
Hereby we would like to state that on 15/11/2006 at 08:45AM ME No-AF-2002-168-MF-337 
located in Shater village District, Injil Province Herat at Team No-08, Section No-03 by the 
name of [the Victim] Deminer injured in Mine accident and the injuries of patient is as below; 
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1. Left arm Lateral Crush injury by the wide and height of 5*6cm. 
2. Left thigh 1*1 cm closed injury from entering foreign body  
3. The Patient has suffered from Hearing Problem of both sides 
4. The Patient has referred to the General Public Hospital of Herat 
5. General condition of patient is satisfactory. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 664 Name: [Name removed] 
Age: 38 Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: 15 minutes 
Protection issued: Long visor 
Frontal apron 
Protection used: Frontal apron, Long 
visor 
 





COMMENT: See Medical report. 
 
Medical report 
No formal Medical report was made available. The IMSMA report was not translated. 
From the investigation: 
“As a result of the explosion the deminer received minor injuries to his left hand and crush 
injuries to his left arm plus a single wound (1 to 1.5cm) to his left thigh where a foreign body 
penetrated the muscle.” 
DoB 1968 
The Victim reached the first medical facility at 09:00 – Herat civilian hospital 
“...the injuries of patient is as below; 
1. Left arm Lateral Crush injury by the wide and height of 5*6cm. 
2. Left thigh 1*1 cm closed injury from entering foreign body  
3. The Patient has suffered from Hearing Problem of both sides 
4. The Patient has referred to the General Public Hospital of Herat 




Statement and Witness Report 1: deminer 
Date: 15 Nov 2006 
Question-1: What demining equipments are you using for excavation in the field please 
explain it? 
Answer-1: Accordance to the procedure we are using prodding for excavation. 
Question-2: How many mines did you find in the minefield? 
Answer- 2: Our party still has been found and destroyed 60 antipersonnel mines successful.  
Question-3: What was the cause of the accident? 
Answer- 3: The cause of the accident was that probably the mine position changed or more 
soil come up over on top of the exploded mine. The victim deminer excavated the signal point 
with 13 up to 20 cm and he thought no mine available and used prodder/shovel faster it was 
victim deminer fault and caused accident. 
Question-4: What is your recommendation for preventing of such accident? 
Answer-4: I have recommended that, since six month our duty in Herat, and during mission 
leave travel form Herat to Kabul by road, thieves have stolen our money and we are worry 
about that. (Stressful work + Stressful life) 
From beginning of the task up to date our section has been working in mine belt, we request 
you to consider the turn and other sections should take part in mine belt. The mines are 
deeper then 13 or 20 cm in some place, I recommended that almost the deminers should 
work carefully. 
 
Statement and Witness Report 2: Section Leader 
Date: 15 Nov 2006 
Question-1: What demining equipments are using in your section for excavations in the field 
please explain it? 
Answer-1: Section No-3 of tern No-8 are using the below equipment: 
MIL-D-1 mine detector, PPE, Prodder, Shovel, Rope, Markers, Ground sheet, marking stick, 
tripwire feeler, gloves and backhoe if necessary. 
Question-2: Which equipment are using by your section deminer for excavation? 
Answer- 2: Our section deminer almost using prodder with support backhoe. 
Question-3: What was the cause of the accident? 
Answer- 3: The cause of the accident was that probably more soil come up over on top of the 
exploded mine, the victim deminer excavated the signal point in fact the exploded mine was 
40 cm. Probably and it was victim deminer fault/neglect and caused accident. 
Question-4: 
How did you know the exploded mine was deeper than 15cm? 
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Answer-4: Because the mine was located inside the stream where mine was exploded form 
both side of stream more soil come down top of the mine. 
 
Statement and witness report 3: Assistant Team Leader 
Date: 15th November 2006 
Question-1: What did you do when the accident took place? 
Answer-1: I was briefing and explained the safety procedures before starting of practical work 
and have told to deminer who are working in the mine belt take care. I was controlling the 
section No-2 and called to team medic and placed him closed to section No-3 because they 
have worked in the mine belt. 
Question-2: What demining equipments are using in your team for excavations in the field 
please explain it? 
Answer- 2: As you know this minefield is continually gives signal and we are excavating the 
area by bayonet and for removing of soft soil using shovel. 
Question-3: What was the cause of the accident? 
Answer- 3: The cause of the accident was that probably more soil come up over on top of the 
exploded mine, the victim deminer excavated the signal point in fact the exploded mine was 
deeper then 13cm probably and I informed all deminers may some of the mine is deep take 
care. 
Question-4: What is your recommendation about such accident? 
Answer-4: The deminers are should be considered team leader, Assistant Team Leader and 
section leader advice in the minefield it is enough for them. 
 
Analysis 
The crush injury to the Victim’s arm and the cut into his body armour were caused by a large 
object hitting both. The part that hit the armour was sharp. These facts lead to the conclusion 
that the Victim was using his shovel at the time, as was admitted in one of the statements.  
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Field control inadequacy because the Victim 
was working in breach of his SOPs and his error was not corrected. The field controllers 
compounded their error by concealing the tool that was in use. The investigators identified a 
contributory cause to be inadequate training, which is a management responsibility. The 
demining group’s senior management are responsible for the appointment and training of 
their field controllers, so the secondary cause is listed as a “Management control 
inadequacy”.  
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